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Two-Way Cable Television and
Informational Privacy
by KENNETH M.H. HOFF*
I
Introduction
In the latter half of the twentieth century, television has be-
come one of the most popular forms of recreation in the United
States.' Television viewers can perceive the sights and sounds
of world events without setting foot outside the security of the
home. They are subjected to a stream of information transmit-
ted from a broadcasting station onto the television screen.
However, recent technological developments in two-way, inter-
active cable television systems2 will create an increasingly im-
portant role for the television medium in our daily lives.3 No
longer will television viewers be limited to the role of passive
absorbers of a one-way stream of communication. Instead, as
subscribers4 to an interactive cable television system, they will
become active partners with cable television companies in a
two-way communication.5
* A.B., University of California at Berkeley, 1980; J.D., University of California at
Davis, 1983; Member, California State Bar. The author currently practices law in Los
Angeles, California.
1. See generally G. COMSTOCK, TELEVISION IN AMERICA (lst ed. 1980).
2. An "interactive cable television system" has the capability to transmit signals
from the television or terminal of a "subscriber," see infra note 4, to a "remote point,"
infra, on a cable communications system. The signal path from the subscriber to the
remote point is known as the upstream communications channel, and the signal path
from the remote point to the subscriber is called the downstream communications
channel. The "remote point" on the interactive cable television system may be either a
cable television broadcaster or an entity which offers an "interactive cable television
service," see infra note 7. Pottle, Cable Shopping Services: Bringing Sears Home, TVC,
June 1, 1981, at 200. See Nash & Bollier, Protecting Privacy in the Age of Hometech,
TECHNOLOGY REVIEW, Aug./Sept. 1981, at 67.
3. See Cable Television Report and Order, 36 F.C.C.2d 141, para. 192 (1972); Con-
sole, Cable Television Privacy Act: Protecting Privacy Interests from Emerging Cable
TV Technology, 35 FED. COM. L.J. 71 (1983).
4. "Subscribers" are persons who receive consumer services offered over an in-
teractive cable television system.
5. Cable television systems today have interactive capability and need only be
rewired to provide the communication link for interactive services. See National Ass'n
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Cable television companies predict6 that interactive cable
television services7 will be offered on a nationwide basis8 by
the 1990's.9 These services will include ° catalog shopping,"
of Regulatory Util. Comm'rs v. FCC, 533 F.2d 601, 605-06 (D.C. Cir. 1976). In 1974, the
Federal Communications Commission (FCC) promulgated a regulation requiring that
cable television systems possess the technical capacity for accomplishing two-way,
nonvoice communications. 47 C.F.R. § 76.251(a) (3) (1974). The regulation was struck
down by the Supreme Court in FCC v. Midwest Video Corp., 440 U.S. 680 (1978). The
Court held that the regulation improperly imposed common carrier obligations on
cable television broadcasters. Id. at 700-09. Federal law restricts the FCC from treat-
ing broadcasters as common carriers. Id. at 702, 705; see Communications Act of 1934,
§ 3(h) (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 153(h) (1983)). The Court ruled that the regulation is-
sued was beyond the jurisdiction of the FCC. 440 U.S. at 708.
6. See Cable Television Report and Order, supra note 3, para. 128.
7. An "interactive cable television service" is a consumer service offered over an
interactive cable television system.
8. See Cable Television Report and Order, supra note 3, para. 130. Interactive
cable television services are in operation on an experimental basis in several cities
throughout the United States. These cities include: Reading, Pennsylvania (Home
Telecommunications. Paths for Growth for the 1980's, FUTURIST, June 1979, at 236-237;
Lane, Which Way Cable?, HuMANIST, Sept./Oct. 1979, at 13); Columbus, Ohio (Wicklein,
Wired City, U.S.A.: The Charms and Dangers of Two-Way TV, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Feb.
1979, at 35; Sloan & Baker, A.T&T. Versus Cable: War of the Wires, FORBES, May 11, 1981,
at 204-05); Rockford, Illinois (Hill, Looking Down the Pipeline-What's in the Future for
Cable?, TVC, Dec. 15, 1979, at 52); Woodlands, Texas (Lynch, Two-Way Cable Protects
America's Safest Town, PopuLAR SCIENCE, July 1977, at 70).
Several corporations currently are bidding for a franchise to operate an interactive
cable television system in Palo Alto, California. Pacific Telephone has proposed to
build a glass fiberoptics system to carry interactive communications. The glass fibers
would consume less space and transmit information more rapidly than the standard
metallic cable. Flinn, Wiring a City for the Computer Age, San Francisco Chron., Nov.
20, 1983, at 1, col. 2. See Marks, Entering the Optical Eighties, TVC, Nov. 15, 1980.
9. See Koughan, The Year the Computer Came Home with a Vengeance: The Liv-
ing-Room Revolution, San Francisco Chron., Jan. 3, 1982, This World, at 16, col. 1.
10. The services mentioned represent only a partial list of potential services pre-
dicted by interactive cable television broadcasters. Some experts in the field predict at
least 65 uses for the interactive cable television system. Nash & Bollier, supra note 2,
at 67.
11. The interactive cable system will permit subscribers to shop, order, and pay for
goods and services by means of electronic selection. The individual will be able to
produce a display of the goods and a service on the television screen. A subscriber can
then press a button on a 6"x 7" x 2 " hand-held console to select the desired item
listed on the display. Black, Brave New World of Television: Columbus Discovers
Qube, NEW TIMES, July 24, 1978, at 40. The viewer's selection will be relayed to the
cable television company, which will in turn relay the communication to the merchan-
diser who offered the goods or services for sale. Pottle, supra note 2, at 200.
Advertisers will be able to research more accurately the impact of targeted persua-
sion on consumers. Some advertisers predict an increase in impulse buying because
the advertisements are designed for quick decision-making and the hand-held console
provides the means to make that instant decision. Merchandisers expect to use con-
sumer survey information to target advertisements to individual households. This sur-
vey information will consist of the past buying habits of individual subscribers. Thus,
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electronic funds transfers, 2 educational assistance, 13 opinion
polling,' 4 community/government relations," home security,'
6
merchandisers can tailor their commercials to reach households which are more likely
to purchase the advertised items. Koughan, supra note 9, at 19.
The results of a catalog sales experiment in cities in the states of Virginia and Mary-
land already have encouraged cable television companies and merchandisers. These
commercial operators expect a strong future in electronic merchandising. Hill, supra
note 8, at 52-59. Sears, Roebuck and Company is prepared to enter the interactive cata-
log shopping market. Sears plans to link video discs consisting of catalog information
to the central computer of an interactive cable television system. One prediction sug-
gests that interactive catalog shopping might total $250 billion in retail sales by 1990.
Koughan, supra note 9, at 19.
12. Interactive cable television systems will facilitate credit and debit arrange-
ments through electronic funds transfer services. The subscriber who purchases
goods or a service can select and pay for the item simultaneously. The subscriber can
make immediate payment by means of an electronic fund transfer from the sub-
scriber's bank account to the account of the business which advertised the goods or
service. Additionally, the subscriber can purchase the item on credit in order to ex-
tend the time for payment. The interactive cable television system will provide a com-
munication link between the financial accounts of the subscriber and the advertising
merchant. See Wicklein, supra note 8, at 35; Hurley, The Wired Home, an Information
Utility, AMERICA, Dec. 2, 1978, at 402-04; Pottle, supra note 2, at 199-203.
13. The use of an interactive cable system as an educational tool has been success-
fully tested. In 1978, Michigan State University conducted a project in Rockford, Illi-
nois, in which the interactive system was used to instruct local firefighters in training
procedures. The experiment consisted of audiovisual teaching with push-button re-
sponses by the firemen to questions asked through the television. The firefighters who
received the instruction through the interactive system achieved higher test scores
and demonstrated superior information retention than did those who had learned from
traditional, one-way communication methods. The results of the experiment suggest
the usefulness of interactive teaching methods as an educational tool. Baldwin, Michi-
gan State University-Rockford Two-Way Cable Project, TVC, Feb. 1, 1979, at 70; Hill,
supra note 8, at 52.
14. The interactive cable television system can conduct opinion polls by asking a
question of the subscriber and then permitting the subscriber to make his or her de-
sired response. The surveys conducted by the interactive cable television system may
involve serious personal and political issues. For example, in one survey conducted by
the Qube interactive system, operated by Warner Cable Corporation in Columbus,
Ohio, a television show host asked whether the audience knew anyone who was a ho-
mosexual. A statement was superimposed on the screen: "I have a friend, relative, or
acquaintance who I know is homosexual." The results of the survey showed that 65%
of the audience responded "yes" and 35% responded "no." Wicklein, supra note 8, at
35. Another survey on the Qube system occurred when a sex therapist appeared on a
variety show called "Celebration." The audience was asked to respond to the following
statement: "The average woman considers her husband/mate's penis, 1) small; 2) av-
erage; 3) large; 4) don't know." Black, supra note 11, at 40.
The above surveys are only examples of questions which can be asked through the
interactive cable television system. Although subscribers may voluntarily submit
their answers to register an opinion, subscribers may not be aware that these opinions
can easily be cross-referenced by the interactive system to produce on paper an indi-
vidually identifiable pattern of political or social beliefs. See Wicklein, supra note 8, at
35; Black, supra note 11, at 40.
15. The interactive cable system permits direct communication between govern-
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and energy management. 7 Interactive cable television will
ment officials and their constituents. Citizens can express their viewpoints about
political issues and community needs while politicians can sample the concerns and
opinions of the people whom they represent.
The Qube system in Columbus, Ohio produced a local program called "Mayor's Fo-
rum" which linked local politicians in the television studio with subscribers at home.
Mayor Francis Healy of Deer Park, Ohio, solicited citizens' comments on the problems
of street repairs. The program permitted viewers to express their opinions concerning
a local tax levy. Dunn, Public Access Boom in Ohio, TVC, May 1, 1981, at 40.
Similar programs have taken place in Reading, Pennsylvania. The Reading project
permitted many senior citizens, who otherwise would not have been able to leave their
homes, to participate in community government functions. See Lane, supra note 8, at
3.
16. The interactive cable system can provide home security services to subscrib-
ers. These services will include burglary and fire protection, as well as emergency
medical assistance. The interactive system will be wired to alert monitors at either the
cable company or at other remote points on the system when the subscriber requires
the assistance of the business providing the service.
However, the interactive cable system will conduct sweeps 24 hours per day. Thus,
the cable computer will be able to monitor continuously a pattern of the subscriber's
movements in and out of the house. See Wicklein, supra note 8, at 35; Nash & Bollier,
supra note 2, at 68; Clarification of the Cable Television Rules and Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking and Inquiry, 46 F.C.C.2d 175, paras. 23-24 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Clari-
fication of the Cable Television Rules]. See infra note 155.
The burglary and fire protection services will be monitored by a computerized sweep
generator which will survey every home terminal wired into the system at six to ten
second intervals. The sweep generator will receive signals which will indicate whether
an emergency has arisen. The sweep generator can detect the presence of an intruder
with the aid of a customized system using motion sensors on doors and windows. The
intrusion would alert the security service which would then notify the police that the
burglar alarm had been activated. In addition to an indication that the house is being
burglarized, the interactive system also will be capable of transmitting information
concerning the house's location, its occupants, and the valuables within the house. In
1977, an experimental interactive burglar alarm system operating in Woodlands, Texas,
resulted in a drastic reduction in successful burglaries within the community. Lynch,
supra note 8, at 70; Sherry, In Pursuit of the Perfect Alarm, TVC, Feb. 1, 1980, at 50.
The fire alarm system will be connected to the same sweep generator used by the
burglar alarm system. An ionization detector senses smoke in the home, and then
relays a signal through the home terminal to a central dispatch computer. The Wood-
lands, Texas experiment demonstrated the success of the fire alarm. Fire trucks were
able to respond to the fire alarm warning within minutes, resulting in the reduction of
the number of fires which caused structural damages. Lynch, supra note 8, at 70.
The emergency medical assistance system will permit subscribers to press a button
in order to activate an alarm notifying medical services in the event of an emergency.
The signal will also transmit information consisting of the subscriber's medical his-
tory, medication record, and family doctor. The availability of this information will
result not only in the savings of time for ambulance service, but in the savings of lives
of subscribers. Black, supra note 11, at 40.
17. The home energy management service will permit utility companies to com-
municate directly with individual subscribers regarding energy consumption. This
service will include automatic water, gas and electric meter readers, power load man-
agement, and complete monitoring, coordination and control of high energy devices.
The central computer of the interactive system will be connected to a device called the
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revolutionize the use of home television by creating a conve-
nient and versatile medium for commercial and informational
communication.
Although these technological advancements will promote ef-
ficiency in commerce and community relations, the benefits of
this progress will not accrue without corresponding dangers.
Interactive cable television threatens individual privacy due to
the system's ability to compile a detailed, centralized, and eas-
ily accessible information source 8 on the personal lives of
subscribers. 9
Under current law, government authorities2" may be able to
gain access to this individually identifiable information2' with-
out the issuance of a search warrant or subpoena,22 and with-
out the knowledge or consent of subscribers.23 Legislatures
have failed to keep pace with this newly developed form of
computer technology.24 Existing statutes that attempt to ad-
home modem. The modem will collect information from the meters, hot water heater,
air conditioner, and other major appliances. The modem can be programmed to alter
the pattern of household energy use in order to allow the home to function at maxi-
mum efficiency.
The interactive system permits the utility company to adjust the energy usage pat-
tern in the home when peak power load is greatest and when cost is most prohibitive.
The subscriber will be able to use the system's two-way capability to adjust the com-
puter's power load control. A subscriber who wants his or her heat lowered for medi-
cal purposes could instruct the computer's temperature monitoring system through
the modem to lower the temperature in the house. Thus, the interactive system will
enable subscribers to lower their energy bills and maximize energy use and efficiency.
Bresnan, Home Energy Management, TVC, July 15, 1981, at 46.
18. The central computer of an interactive cable television system will be able to
record, cross-reference, and analyze the information transmitted by subscribers. Nash
& Bollier, supra note 2, at 67, 70.
19. See id. at 68-72; Testimony of Attorney General Robert Abrams Before the New
York State Assembly Committee on Governmental Operations on the Topic of "The
Future of Cable Television in New York State" (May 6, 1982) [hereinafter cited as The
Future of Cable Television in New York State]; Clarification of The Cable Television
Rules, supra note 16, para. 23.
20. The term "government authority" refers to any office, department, board, com-
mission, bureau, division, public corporation, agency or instrumentality of the United
States, or of any state, commonwealth, territory, possession, or political subdivision
thereof.
21. "Individually identifiable information" refers to any information that identifies
an individual as a subscriber to a cable television service, or that otherwise provides
information about that individual, or his or her use of a service provided by a cable
television system.
22. See The Future of Cable Television in New York State, supra note 19. See also
infra notes 41-124 and accompanying text.
23. Id.
24. See The Future of Cable Television in New York State, supra note 19; REPORT
OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR THE REVIEW OF FEDERAL AND STATE LAws RELATING
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dress informational privacy concerns analogous to those
presented by the potential abuses of the interactive cable tele-
vision system are inadequate to protect against the particular
threats to personal privacy which may arise.2" Therefore, new
laws must be enacted to establish the right of the subscriber to
control governmental 26 access to the information within the in-
teractive cable television system.
This article addresses generally the growth of computerized
information banks and their potential threat to individual pri-
vacy. It discusses the inadequacies of existing law in regulat-
ing the threat to individual privacy posed by the interactive
cable television system. This article then suggests reforms in
the law which would establish the individual's right to privacy
regarding the information compiled within and disseminated
from the interactive cable television system. Finally, this arti-
cle proposes a model statute which embodies the suggested
reforms.
II
Computers and Informational Privacy
The growth in computer technology in the post-World War II
TO WIRETAPPING AND ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE 28 (1976) [hereinafter cited as REPORT
OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION 1; Nash & Bollier, supra note 2, at 67, 72.
25. Id. By gaining access to the files of a cable company, Internal Revenue Service
agents may audit the financial status of a subscriber, or law enforcement agents may
review informational profiles of any number of subscribers during a criminal investiga-
tion. The memory of governmental spying on private citizens in the past few decades
strongly suggests the need for legislation to restrict governmental access to the infor-
mation in the interactive cable television system. See supra notes 11-17.
26. This article recognizes that there are similar, if not greater, dangers in the un-
restricted access by private parties to the information within the interactive cable tele-
vision system. The degree of detail in the information transmitted by subscribers
presents a tremendous commercial resource to cable companies. Cable companies
may be able to sell individually identifiable information to private groups as mailing
lists are freely sold today. The Future of Cable Television in New York State, supra
note 18. See Comment, Subscription List Sales and the Elusive Right of Privacy, 62
IOWA L. REV. 591 (1976). This concern raises issues relating to the right to disseminate
information under the commercial speech provisions of the first amendment. Barrett,
"The Uncharted Area"-Commercial Speech and the First Amendment, 13 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 175 (1980). This article discusses only the legal issues concerning access by gov-
ernment authorities to the information within the interactive cable television system.
However, the model statute proposed in this article addresses the problems created by
the availability of this information to private entities. See infra note 146 and Appendix.
The provisions of the model statute restrict access by private entities, as well as by the
government, to information transmitted to or recorded by cable companies. See infra
notes 102, 136, and 151-74.
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era has enabled people to collect and evaluate data with great
speed and efficiency." Computerized information banks are
able to collate, store, and retrieve vast quantities of data at the
press of a button.28 This capacity of computers to process in-
formation continues to develop in an exponential
progression.29
The proliferation of data transmitted to and collected within
information storage systems has decreased the individual citi-
zen's control over the release of personal information. 0 So-
phisticated data gathering techniques threaten to expose the
individual's life history to anyone who has access to the com-
puterized data network.31 The computer's capacity to store
and regurgitate data permits the computer to create detailed
and easily accessible data profiles on any individual about
whom information has been processed.3 2 Moreover, informa-
tion can be electronically intercepted at points along the line of
transmission between parties to a computerized communica-
tion.3 Thus, personal information passing through computer
banks can be disseminated to a wider audience than the indi-
27. Miller, Personal Privacy in the Computer Age: The Challenge of a New Technol-
ogy in an Information-Oriented Society, 67 MICH. L. REV. 1091, 1093-94 (1969).
28. Computer data banks are commonly used by parties who need to aggregate
and assess large amounts of personal information. Employers need to gather informa-
tion about prospective employees to help them decide whom to hire. See REPORT OF
THE TASK FORCE ON PRIVACY AND COMPUTERS BY THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMUNICATION
AND THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE OF CANADA 9-10 (1972) [hereinafter cited as PRIVACY
AND COMPUTERS]; AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE, PRIVACY PROTECTION PROPOSALS 32
(1979) [hereinafter cited as PRIVACY PROTECTION PROPOSALS]. Credit lenders need to
determine which individuals are good credit risks. See PRIVACY AND COMPUTERS,
supra, at 55. Insurance companies must protect themselves from inaccurate applica-
tions and fraudulent claims. See PRIVACY PROTECTION PROPOSALS, supra, at 39; PRI-
VACY AND COMPUTERS, supra, at 59. Research groups compile information to make
studies of society. See PRIVACY AND COMPUTERS, supra, at 50. Mailing list vendors use
consumer profiles to target potential customers. See PRIVACY AND COMPUTERS, supra,
at 64-65; Note, Commercial Information Brokers, 4 COLUM. HUMAN RIGHTS L. REV. 203,
212-15 (1972). Government law enforcement agencies collect information related to
criminal activities in order to facilitate the identification of individuals during a crimi-
nal investigation. See Katzenbach & Tomc, Crime Data Centers: The Use of Computers
in Crime Detection and Prevention, 4 COLUM. HUMAN RIGHTS L. REV. 49, 50-52 (1972).
29. Miller, supra note 27, at 1093-94.
30. See Miller, Computers, Data Banks and Individual Privacy: An Overview, 4
COLUM. HUMAN RIGHTS L. REV. 1 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Computers, Data Banks
and Individual Privacy]; Miller, supra note 27, at 1107-19.
31. See Miller, Computers, Data Banks and Individual Privacy, supra note 30, at 1-
7; Countryman, The Diminishing Right of Privacy: The Personal Dossier and the Com-
puter, 49 TEX. L. REV. 837, 838 (1971); Miller, supra note 27, at 1109-19.
32. Countryman, supra note 31, at 838.
33. Miller, supra note 27, at 1119-23.
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vidual who originally provided the information might have
anticipated.
The aggregation of large volumes of information increases
the possibilities for human error in processing the data within
a network of computers. Information may be transmitted to
and recorded in remote computers for reasons having nothing
to do with the original collection of the material. A computer
programmer may mistakenly, negligently, or maliciously add
inaccurate information to a data file.3 4 Once the incorrect data
becomes part of the information file, magnification of the error
may occur as the information disseminates from data gatherer
to data gatherer. Even if the information transmitted in the
computer is free of error, the further danger of the data being
interpreted out of its original context may arise.3 5 The distri-
bution of disorganized, misleading or unanalyzed information
may lead to an improper inference by remote parties.3 6 An un-
corrected or out-of-date record can compound the danger of
widely spread misinformation, as people often unthinkingly ac-
cept the accuracy of the product of a computer data bank.
Once a third party draws an inaccurate interpretation from the
data, one can expect an acceleration of the dissemination of
that mistaken inference.
The interactive cable television system will bring yet another
computer data bank into the existing information storage sys-
tem. The number of interactive cable television services pro-
vided will invite the transmission of a vast amount and wide
variety of information about the individual.38 Computers
within the interactive cable television system will be able to
store, cross-reference, and retrieve all the information entered
therein 9.3 Although other data banks currently exist, the inter-
active cable television system potentially may become one of
the most detailed computerized informational sources of the
twentieth century.40
34. See id. at 1114-15; Countryman, supra note 31, at 864-65.
35. Miller, supra note 27, at 1115.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 1114-19; Miller, Computers, Data Banks and Individual Privacy, supra
note 30, at 8-9.
38. See supra notes 10-19 and accompanying text.
39. Nash & Bollier, supra note 2, at 67.
40. See The Future of Cable Television in New York State, supra note 19.
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III
The Inadequacy of Current Law As Applied to the
Interactive Cable Television System
Government authorities may easily and lawfully gain access
to information transmitted to and stored within the interactive
cable television system. Government access may be acquired
by electronic surveillance of communications transmitted by
subscribers or by request to a cable broadcaster for the stored
information.4 Existing law permits use of these access meth-
ods without the knowledge or consent of subscribers and with-
out the restrictive safeguards of judicial supervision." Current
law does not adequately regulate the gathering and dissemi-
nating of computerized information.43 Thus, the privacy
rights of subscribers in the individually identifiable informa-
41. See infra notes 45-144 and accompanying text.
42. "Judicial supervision" refers to search warrants and subpoenas.
43. See Burnham, Loophole in Law Raises Concern About Privacy in Computer
Age, N.Y. Times, Dec. 19, 1983, § 1, at 1, col. 1 (discussing the concerns of privacy ex-
perts regarding loopholes in laws concerning computerized communication technology
and stating that several United States Congressmen are considering the possibility of
rewriting these laws in order to close these loopholes).
44. The concept of the right of privacy originated in a law review article written in
1890 by Louis Brandeis and Samuel Warren. Warren & Brandeis, The Right of Privacy,
4 HARv. L. REV. 193 (1890). The article pieced together previous decisions which af-
forded relief in various tort actions concerning the publication of personal information.
Id. at 193-220. The authors concluded that these cases stood for the broader principle
termed the right of privacy. Id. at 206. This concept was later expanded by William
Prosser. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383 (1960). Prosser determined that the
existing framework of the right of privacy was oversimplified. He devised four distinct
types of invasion of privacy rights and interests of an individual. These tortious inva-
sions are: (1) intrusion upon seclusion or solitude; (2) public disclosure of private
facts; (3) placing a person in a false light in the public eye; and (4) appropriations of
name or likeness. Id. at 389. In recent years, the United States Supreme Court has
further expanded the right of privacy by acknowledging the existence in the United
States Constitution of protected zones of privacy. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479, 484 (1965). These zones of privacy have been found to be included within the
rights guaranteed in the first amendment (NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958)
(freedom of association); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969) (freedom of ex-
pression)), third amendment (see discussion in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. at
484, and Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350 n.5 (1967), regarding the prohibition
against the quartering of soldiers in any house in time of peace without the consent of
the owner), fourth amendment (Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. at 350 (search and
seizure of private citizens by government authorities)), fifth amendment (Tehan v.
United States, 382 U.S. 406, 416 (1966) (privilege against self-incrimination)), ninth
amendment (Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. at 486-87 (Goldberg, J., concurring)
(discussing the importance of the language of the ninth amendment regarding rights
retained by the people which are not enumerated in the Constitution)), and fourteenth
amendment (Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-56 (1973) (right to an abortion upheld
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tion transmitted within the interactive cable television system
are threatened.
A. Electronic Surveillance
Since the development of the telegraph, courts and legisla-
tures have wrestled with the issue of surveillance by electronic
communications.4 5 However, existing law intended to control
electronic surveillance has failed to keep pace with modern
technology.
1. Electronic Surveillance and the Fourth Amendment
Electronic surveillance initiated by government authorities
must be conducted within the limitations imposed by the
fourth amendment.46 The fourth amendment guarantees the
right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, pa-
against state restrictions); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961) (fourth amendment
protections held applicable to the states)).
45. The state of California enacted the first statute prohibiting the interception of
telegraphic messages in 1862. See S. DASH, R. SCHWARTZ & R. KNOWLTON, THE EAVES-
DROPPERS 23 (1st. ed. 1959). The issue of the constitutionality of electronic surveillance
first emerged in Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928). The United States
Supreme Court held that statements made by the defendant during a telephone con-
versation which were obtained by electronic surveillance conducted by federal govern-
ment authorities without the issuance of a search warrant were admissible in evidence
under the fourth amendment. Id. at 464-69. The Court concluded that the federal au-
thorities had not conducted an unreasonable search and seizure within the fourth
amendment by the warrantless electronic surveillance of communications transmitted
across telephone wires. Id. at 464-66. The Court reasoned that the communication was
not a paper or material tangible effect subject to the proscriptions of the fourth amend-
ment, and that the telephone wires were not an area protected by the fourth amend-
ment. Id. at 459-65.
In 1934, Congress reacted to the Olmstead decision by enacting 47 U.S.C. § 605, which
prohibited the interception and disclosure of communications without the consent of
the sender. The Supreme Court held that evidence obtained by wiretapping in viola-
tion of the statute was inadmissible in federal courts. Nardone v. United States, 302
U.S. 379, 382 (1937). The Court based its decision on its supervisory powers over fed-
eral courts and officers, and not on constitutional grounds. See id. at 379-84.
In the 1960's, the Supreme Court began to reverse the constitutional theories stated
in the Olmstead decision. First, the Court declared that the fourth amendment applies
to intangible items of evidence searched and seized. Silverman v. United States, 365
U.S. 505, 512 (1961). Thus, an intangible item, such as a conversation, receives the
same fourth amendment protection as a tangible item. Second, the Court held that the
fourth amendment protects people and is not limited to geographical areas. Thus, the
privacy of the conversation receives protection at any point along the line of communi-
cation. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967).
46. See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347
(1967). See also infra notes 52-73 and accompanying text.
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pers, and effects against unreasonable searches. 47 Determina-
tion of whether the electronic surveillance constitutes an
unreasonable search 48 depends on whether the person invok-
ing the fourth amendment demonstrates a legitimate expecta-
tion of privacy that has been invaded by the government
action.49 First, the person must show that he or she sought to
preserve the communication as private.5" Second, society must
be prepared to recognize the individual's expectation of pri-
vacy as reasonable.51 If the individual does not demonstrate
this reasonable expectation of privacy, then the government
may conduct the electronic surveillance without a search war-
rant.8 2 Recent Supreme Court decisions suggest that interac-
tive cable television subscribers may have difficulty
establishing this expectation of privacy in their electronic com-
munications. 53 Thus, the fourth amendment may provide mini-
mal protection to the informational privacy of subscribers.
Government authorities may conduct electronic surveillance
of subscriber communications if both the cable broadcaster
and the subscriber are aware of the surveillance, or if the cable
broadcaster participates in the surveillance without the con-
47. U.S. CONST. amend. IV; Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. at 739.
48. Electronic surveillance constitutes a search; the question becomes whether or
not the search is reasonable. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. at 740.
49. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. at 740; United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 7
(1977); Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 (1978).
50. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. at 740; Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. at 361-62
(Harlan, J., concurring).
51. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. at 740; Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. at 361-62
(Harlan, J., concurring).
52. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. at 745-46. Government authorities must obtain
prior judicial authorization in order to conduct electronic surveillance which would
constitute an unreasonable search. The Supreme Court has held that an order must
be obtained from a neutral magistrate prior to the surveillance. Berger v. United
States, 388 U.S. 41, 54 (1967). The order must comply with the following standards in
order to satisfy the requirements of the fourth amendment: (1) particularity in
describing the place to be searched and the person or thing to be seized; (2) particular-
ity in describing the crime that has been, is being, or is about to be committed; (3) par-
ticularity in describing the type of conversation sought; (4) limitations on the officer
executing the eavesdrop order which would prevent his searching unauthorized areas
and prevent further searching once the property was found; (5) probable cause in exe-
cuting the eavesdrop order; (6) dispatch in executing the eavesdrop order; (7) a re-
quirement that the executing officer make a return or the eavesdrop order showing
what was seized; (8) a showing of exigent circumstances in order to overcome the de-
fect if not giving prior notice. Id. at 54-60.
53. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979); United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745
(1971); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). See infra notes 54-77 and accompany-
ing text.
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sent of the subscriber. The fourth amendment protects sub-
scribers where the government conducts warrantless
electronic surveillance without the consent of either the sub-
scriber or the cable company. In Katz v. United States,4 the
Supreme Court held that the warrantless electronic surveil-
lance of a telephone conversation without the consent of either
party to the communication constituted an unreasonable
search.5 The Court held that the defendant had a legitimate
expectation of privacy that the words he uttered into the tele-
phone would not be broadcast to the world. 6 Thus, the elec-
tronic surveillance constituted a search which required the
sanction of a search warrant.57 The reasoning of the Katz
Court would apply to prohibit the government from conducting
electronic surveillance without a search warrant in the ab-
sence of the consent of either the subscriber or the cable
broadcaster.
The Katz rationale, however, has not been extended to cases
in which one party has voluntarily assisted government au-
thorities in the electronic surveillance of another party's com-
munications. Courts have held that such surveillance is not
entitled to the protections of the fourth amendment.58 Thus,
subscribers may not be protected by the fourth amendment
where a cable company participates in the government's elec-
tronic surveillance of a subscriber's communications.5 9
54. 389 U.S. 347 (1967). In Katz, federal government agents conducted electronic
surveillance of the defendant's conversation with a monitoring device placed on the
outside of a telephone booth. The government agents did not have the authorization of
either party to the conversation, nor had they obtained a search warrant.
55. Id. at 357-59.
56. Id. at 352.
57. Id. at 357.
58. United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 754 (1971); Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S.
293, 303 (1966); Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 438 (1963).
59. Government authorities may also conduct electronic surveillance of subscriber
communications through the involuntary assistance of cable companies. See United
States v. New York Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159, 168-69 (1977) (holding that federal district
courts have the power to order telephone companies to assist government agencies in
the electronic surveillance of customer communications).
Although a cable company, may choose to oppose electronic surveillance of sub-
scriber communications, subscribers must still rely on the good faith and discretion of
the cable company. Government pressure imposed on the interactive cable television
industry might induce cable companies to be less restrictive with their information
banks. Thus, subscribers cannot be assured that the communications which they
transmit within the interactive cable television system win not be voluntarily con-
veyed to government authorities. It should be noted that the Warner Cable Corpora-
tion has set a formal code to govern the use of subscriber information. P. DENN & C.
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In United States v. White,6 ° the Supreme Court held that the
government does not need a search warrant to conduct elec-
tronic surveillance of one party to a communication where the
other party assists the government in the surveillance.6 1 The
Court reasoned that fourth amendment provides no protection
to an individual who believes that another person to whom he
or she confides information will not reveal that information to a
government authority.2 Because the other party could ver-
bally relate that information to a government authority, no in-
vasion of the speaker's reasonable expectation of privacy
occurs when the other party uses an electronic device to trans-
mit the conversation to a government authority.6 3 Thus, an in-
dividual is not entitled to fourth amendment protection when
the government conducts warrantless electronic surveillance
of the speaker with the voluntary assistance of the other party
to the communication. 4
Arguably, the cable company may be considered a party to
all communications transmitted by a subscriber. The sub-
scriber transmits information directly to the cable company,
which then communicates the data to the provider of an inter-
active cable television service. 5 Under this arrangement, the
cable broadcaster becomes a party to the communication and
may consent to the electronic surveillance of the subscriber's
communications. Thus, the government will not need a search
warrant to conduct the surveillance.
Government authorities may be able to conduct warrantless
electronic surveillance of subscribers with the assistance of
the broadcaster even if the broadcaster is deemed not to be a
party to the communication. The government may be able to
use the broadcaster's position as a medium of communication
SMrr, THE CONSUMER AND CABLE IN CALIFORNIA, REPORT BY THE CALIFORNIA PUBLIC
BROADCASTING COMMISSION 54 (1983). However, the volume and sensitivity of the in-
formation recorded by cable companies make self-regulation an inadequate safeguard.
60. 401 U.S. 745 (1971) (upholding a criminal conviction based on incriminating
statements overheard by government agents during a warrantless electronic surveil-
lance in which the agents overheard the statements by means of a transmitter which
an informant consented to wear during his meetings with the defendant).
61. Id. at 749.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 751-53.
64. The person assisting the government may be an agent who regularly communi-
cates with the authorities. Id. at 749.
65. See supra notes 2 and 10-17.
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between the subscriber and a remote party to gain access to
the subscriber's transmission without a search warrant.
In Smith v. Maryland,66 the Supreme Court upheld the war-
rantless electronic surveillance by the government, with the
assistance of the telephone company, of the numbers dialed
from a person's telephone.67 The Court held that a person has
no legitimate expectation of privacy that the numbers dialed
from his home will not be revealed by the telephone company
to government authorities.68 First, all telephone customers re-
alize that they must convey dialed numbers to the telephone
company through the latter's switching equipment in order to
complete calls.69 Second, telephone customers also know that
the telephone company has facilities for making permanent
records of the dialed numbers. 0 Finally, customers must real-
ize that the telephone company does in fact use this informa-
tion as part of their records for legitimate business purposes.7
Under these circumstances, a person could not harbor any le-
gitimate expectation that the dialed numbers voluntarily con-
veyed to the telephone company would not be revealed to
government authorities. 72 The government's action was not an
unreasonable search within the meaning of the fourth amend-
ment.73 Thus, the government did not need a warrant to con-
duct the electronic surveillance.74
The Smith decision suggests that government authorities
may similarly be able to conduct warrantless electronic sur-
veillance of subscriber communications. Subscribers must
transmit information to the cable broadcaster through the in-
teractive cable television system.71 Clearly, the system's com-
puters are capable of recording the contents of the
communication. 76 Without restrictions concerning the "legiti-
66. 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
67. Id. at 741-46. The telephone company used an electronic device called a pen
register to monitor the numbers of the outgoing calls. Id. at 736. See infra notes 88-94
and accompanying text.
68. 442 U.S. at 742-46.
69. Id. at 742.
70. Id. at 743.
71. Id. The telephone company records numbers dialed for purposes of preparing
monthly billing, checking billing operations, detecting fraudulent uses of the system,
and aiding in the identification of persons making obscene or annoying calls. Id. at 742.
72. Id. at 743-44.
73. Id. at 745-46.
74. Id. at 746.
75. See supra notes 2 and 10-17.
76. Nash & Bollier, supra note 2, at 67. Smith may be read together with United
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macy" of the cable broadcaster's use of the information, cable
broadcasters will be able to make permanent records of these
communications for their own business purposes.7 7 A sub-
scriber may have no legitimate expectation of privacy concern-
ing information transmitted through a cable broadcaster's
computer. Thus, with the assistance of a cable broadcaster,
government authorities may be able to conduct warrantless
electronic surveillance of a subscriber's communications with-
out violating the fourth amendment.
2. Electronic Surveillance and Statutory Law
The fourth amendment is not the sole source of protection
against arbitrary and unsupervised electronic surveillance by
government authorities. Electronic surveillance must also be
conducted within the standards of Title III of the Omnibus
Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 (Title III).78 Title
III establishes the minimum standards regulating the conduct
of electronic surveillance by federal government authorities.7 9
States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976), to suggest that the government may conduct elec-
tronic surveillance of the content of subscriber communications through the assist-
ance of a cable broadcaster. See infra notes 107-16 and accompanying text. In Miller,
the Court held that the defendant had no expectation of privacy in the content of bank
records exposed to bank employees in the ordinary course of business. 425 U.S. at 442-
43. The Smith Court's holding may, in theory, be extended to the content of a tele-
phone conversation or of a subscriber communication. See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S.
at 746-48 (Stewart & Brennan, JJ., dissenting); id. at 749-50 (Marshall & Brennan, JJ.,
dissenting).
77. A cable company may record the information for purposes of customer service,
billing, monitoring unauthorized reception, or the sale of information. See supra notes
26 and 71.
78. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Title III]. Title III amends 47
U.S.C. § 605 (1934), in order to govern completely the regulation of electronic surveil-
lance by federal agents. S. REP. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d. Sess 90, reprinted in 1968 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2112, 2153-62 [hereinafter cited as S. REP. No. 10971.
79. Under Title III, individual states retain the option to adopt the minimum stan-
dards of the statute or to adopt more restrictive standards. 18 U.S.C. § 2516(2) (1982);
S. REP. No. 1097, supra note 78, at 2187; United States v. Hall, 543 F.2d 1229, 1232 (9th
Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1075 (1977); State v. Farha, 218 Kan. 394, 544 P.2d 341,
cert. denied, 420 U.S. 949 (1975). See infra note 81. No applications to conduct elec-
tronic surveillance by state law enforcement agents may be authorized unless a spe-
cific statute permits such activity. Therefore, states may adopt more restrictive
standards by enacting stricter legislation or by refusing to enact any legislation. 18
U.S.C. § 2516(2) (1970); S. REP. No. 1097, supra note 78, at 2187.
Forty-four jurisdictions in the United States, including the District of Columbia,
have enacted legislation delineating the framework for electronic surveillance of com-
munications. See infra note 102. Only three of these jurisdictions have regulated elec-
tronic surveillance of the type of communications which will be transmitted through
the interactive system. CAL. PENAL CODE § 62 (West Supp. 1984); GA. CODE. ANN. §§ 26-
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Enacted to protect the privacy of wire communications," Title
III lists the standards and procedures under which electronic
surveillance may be conducted.81 Although Title III estab-
3001 to -3010 (1983); IOWA CODE ANN. § 727.8 (West 1979). See infra notes 83-102 and
accompanying text for a discussion of the inadequacy of Title III to regulate electronic
surveillance of communications within the interactive system. See also infra note 155.
During the 1980's, 21 states enacted legislation making criminal the unauthorized
access into computerized information systems:
(1) CAL. PENAL CODE § 502 (West Supp. 1984)
(2) COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 18-5.5-101 to -102 (Supp. 1983)
(3) DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 858 (Supp. 1982)
(4) GA. CODE ANN. §§ 26-9949a to -9954a (1983)
(5) IDAHO CODE §§ 18-2201 to -2202 (Supp. 1984)
(6) MICH. STAT. ANN. §§ 28.529(1)-.529(7) (Callaghan 1981)
(7) MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 609.87-.89 (West Supp. 1984)
(8) Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 569.093-.099 (Vernon Supp. 1984)
(9) MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 45-6-310 to -311 (Supp. 1983)
(10) NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 205.473-.477 (1983).
(11) N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 30-16A-1 to -4 (Supp. 1983)
(12) N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 14-453 to -457 (Supp. 1984)
(13) N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 12.1-06 to .1-08 (Supp. 1983)
(14) 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3933 (Purdon Supp. 1983)
(15) R.I. GEN. LAws §§ 11-52-1 to -5 (Supp. 1983)
(16) S.D. Coup. LAws ANN. §§ 43-43B-1 to -7 (1983)
(17) TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 39-3-1401 to -1406 (Supp. 1983)
(18) UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 76-6-701 to -704 (Supp. 1983)
(19) VA. CODE § 18.2-98.1 (1982)
(20) WIsc. STAT. ANN. § 943.70 (West Supp. 1984)
(21) Wyo. STAT. §§ 6-3-501 to -505 (1983)
These laws generally prohibit the introduction, retrieval, and alteration of information
within computer systems. This trend suggests that a growing number of jurisdictions
are recognizing the danger of unauthorized access to computerized information sys-
tems. However, these laws fail to provide the subject of an information file with the
authority to limit the dissemination of personalized information. These laws are
designed to prohibit tampering with computerized information, and not to restrict the
distribution of information without the authority of the subject. Although a third party
may not gain access to this information without the authority of an information gath-
erer, these limitations disappear once the third party obtains that authorization.
80. Title III defines a wire communication as "any communication made in whole
or in part through the use of facilities for the transmission of communications by the
aid of wire, cable, or other like connection between the point of origin and the point of
reception furnished or operated by any person engaged as a common carrier in provid-
ing or operating such facilities for the transmission of interstate or foreign communica-
tions." 18 U.SC.§ 2510(1) (1982).
81. Title III embodies the holding of Berger v. United States, 388 U.S. 41 (1967),
which established the minimum standards necessary for a wiretapping statute to sat-
isfy the requirements of the fourth amendment. The Berger Court struck down a New
York state statute giving a blanket grant to eavesdrop electronically without adequate
judicial supervision. See supra note 52.
Title III more specifically restricts the scope of electronic surveillance than does Ber-
ger. The statute enumerates in detail which facts must be stated in a court-issued
surveillance order. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(4) (1982). In addition, the statute limits the length
of an order to 30 days. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(5) (1982). Finally, Title III provides a civil rem-
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lishes the framework of authorized electronic surveillance, it
does not apply to potential methods of surveillance by interac-
tive cable television system communications. The statute has
not been amended to adjust to developments in computerized
communications.2 Thus, government authorities may be able
to ignore the restrictions against the conduct of electronic sur-
veillance set forth in Title III.
The deficiency of Title III lies in the statutory language used
to define electronic surveillance. The statute employs the term
"intercept" to describe restricted methods of electronic sur-
veillance.83 Title III defines "intercept" as the "aural acquisi-
tion of the contents of any wire or oral communication through
the use of any electronic, mechanical, or other device.18 4 An
aural acquisition, by definition, engages the sense of hearing.8
Subscriber communications, however, will not involve voice
transmissions. 6 Similar to other computer communication
systems, digital signals rather than sound transmissions will
be used to convey information. 7 Without sound transmission,
government authorities need not make aural acquisitions of
subscriber communications to conduct electronic surveillance
of subscribers. Thus, a literal reading of Title III suggests that
electronic surveillance of interactive communications will fall
outside the scope of the statute.
Judicial interpretations of the term "aural" have supported
this literal reading of Title III. This issue arises most fre-
quently in cases involving electronic surveillance of telephone
communications by pen registers8 8 and traces. 9 Courts have
edy with specified damage claims to a party against whom the government conducts an
electronic surveillance. 18 U.S.C. § 2520 (1982).
82. Burnham, supra note 43, at B18, col. 1. See REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMIS-
SION, supra note 24, at 28.
83. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510(4), 2511 (1982). See infra note 134.
84. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(4) (1982) (emphasis added).
85. United States v. Seidlitz, 589 F.2d 152, 157 (4th Cir. 1978),cert. denied, 441 U.S.
922 (1979); In re United States v. Southwestern Bell Tel., 546 F.2d 243, 245 (8th Cir.
1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1008 (1977); United States v. Turk, 526 F.2d 654, 658-59 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 823 (1976); United States v. Falcone, 505 F.2d 478, 482 (3d Cir.
1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 955 (1975); Smith v. Wunker, 356 F. Supp. 44, 45 (S.D. Ohio
1972).
86. Clarification of the Cable Television Rules, supra note 16, para. 23; Cable Tele-
vision Report and Order, supra note 3, para. 128; National Ass'n of Regulatory Util.
Comm'rs v. FCC, 533 F.2d 601, 610 (1976).
87. Id. See Burnham, supra note 43, § 1, at B18, col. 1.
88. A pen register is an electronic device which determines the telephone num-
bers of outgoing calls from a monitored telephone. United States v. New York Tel. Co.,
No. 41
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consistently held that neither pen registers nor traces are gov-
erned by Title III. These devices monitor and record the tele-
phone numbers dialed from a particular telephone terminal,
rather than the verbal communications between callers." Pen
registers and traces do not involve sound transmissions, and
hence are not aural.92 Instead, they record and decipher infor-
mation in a form interpreted by sight.93 Because these devices
are incapable of accomplishing the aural acquisition of any
communication, their operation remains outside of the cover-
age of Title III."
Furthermore, this rationale has been extended to the elec-
tronic surveillance of the substance of computer data commu-
nications.9  In United States v. Seidlitz, 96 the court held that a
434 U.S. 159, 161 n.1 (1977). "A pulsation of the dial on the line to which the pen register
is attached records on a paper tape dashes equal in number to the number dialed."
Hodge v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 555 F.2d 254, 255 n.1 (9th Cir. 1977) (quoting
United States v. Caplan, 253 F. Supp. 805, 807 (E.D. Mich. 1966)). The pen register de-
codes outgoing telephone numbers by responding to changes in electronic voltage
caused by either the turning of a telephone dial or the pressing of buttons on a push
button telephone. United States v. New York Tel. Co., 434 U.S. at 167.
89. A trace determines the telephone numbers of incoming calls to the monitored
telephone in order to trace the origin of the call. Michigan Bell Tel. Co. v. United
States, 565 F.2d 385, 388 n.5 (6th Cir. 1977); In re United States, 610 F.2d 1148, 1152-53 (3d
Cir. 1979). A more detailed analysis of the tracing process appears in State v. Hibbs,
123 N.J. Super. 152, 154-59, 301 A.2d 789, 790-94 (Mercer County Ct. 1972).
90. United States v. New York Tel. Co., 434 U.S. at 167; United States v. Giordano,
416 U.S. 505, 553 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Hodge v.
Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 555 F.2d at 257; United States v. Falcone, 505 F.2d at 482
(pen registers). Michigan Bell Tel. Co. v. United States, 565 F.2d at 388; United States
v. Seidlitz, 589 F.2d, at 157 (traces).
91. United States v. New York Tel. Co., 434 US. at 167 (pen registers). Michigan
Bell Tel. Co. v. United States, 565 F.2d at 388 (traces).
92. 434 U.S. at 167; 565 F.2d at 388.
93. 434 U.S. at 167; 565 F.2d at 388.
94. 434 U.S. at 167; 565 F.2d at 388.
95. See United States v. Seidlitz, 589 F.2d 152 (4th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S.
922 (1979).
96. Id. The Seidlitz case involved an appeal from a conviction for fraud by wire
under 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (1970). The defendant Seidlitz worked for Optimum Systems,
Inc. (OSI), a computer service company that installed and operated a computer for the
Federal Energy Administration (FEA). He resigned from his job after working several
months, during which time he had prepared the software for the computer and was
responsible for the system's security. Afterwards, Seidlitz conducted a series of unau-
thorized intrusions into the central computer system. Computer specialists of the
FEA and OSI traced the intrusions to the defendant's office. The specialists then acti-
vated a spy device which recorded both the requests of the defendant to the computer
and the computer's responses. The device was installed and operated without judicial
authorization. Evidence of the information obtained by the spy device and by the
traces was turned over to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). The FBI then
searched Seidlitz's office where computer printouts containing the information re-
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device which recorded computer data communications did not
accomplish an intercept in violation of Title III.9 There was no
aural acquisition of the contents of the communication be-
cause the device did not rely upon sounds to retrieve informa-
tion from the computer in written form.98 The Seidlitz court
held that the scope of the statute was restricted by the plain
meaning of the term "aural" as provided in Title III. 99 Thus,
the court refused to extend the statute to cover a device which
did not detect sound but merely interpreted the substance of a
computer transmission. 100
The Seidlitz holding exposes the deficiencies of Title III as
applied to the interactive cable television system.1 1 Because
subscribers will not transmit information which can be ac-
quired by the sense of hearing, subscriber communications
cannot be "intercepted" within the meaning of Title 111.102
corded by the spy device were found. The defendant moved to suppress the evidence
of the printouts. He argued that the search was illegal because the information sup-
porting the FBI's warrant was obtained through illegal electronic surveillance by the
spy. Id. at 153-55.
97. Id. at 157.
98. Id.
99. Id. A party asserting that a word in a statute should be given a meaning differ-
ent from that found in common use has the burden of showing that a statutory defini-
tion or evident legislative purpose requires that meaning. Train v. Colorado Pub.
Interest Research Group, 426 U.S. 1, 10 (1976); Gensco, Inc. v. Welling, 329 U.S. 244, 250
(1945). The Seidlitz court used the Webster's dictionary definition in holding that the
words "aural acquisition," literally translated, meant "to come into possession through
the sense of hearing." 589 F.2d at 157 n.17.
100. 589 F.2d at 157. In addition, the court held that the information recorded by the
spy device before it was transmitted to the defendant was not a wire communication
under Title III. The information was obtained without being communicated through
the facilities of a common carrier. Id. at 157. See supra note 80. Moreover, the elec-
tronic surveillance was not conducted in violation of Title III because the court held
that OSI was a party to the communication and could lawfully intercept the communi-
cation. Id. at 158. See 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(c)-(d) (1982).
101. Seidlitz generally exposes the deficiencies of Title III as applied to any comput-
erized communications system. See Burnham, supra note 43.
102. See supra note 86 and accompanying text. Forty-one of the 44 jurisdictions
which have attempted to regulate electronic surveillance have enacted laws which per-
petuate the shortcomings of the language of Title III. See supra note 79.
(1) ALA. CODE §§ 13A-11-30 to -37 (1982)
(2) ALAsKA STAT. §§ 42.20.300-.340 (1983)
(3) ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-3007 to -3014 (Supp. 1983)
(4) COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 16-15-101 to -104 (1978)
(5) CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 54-41a to -41t (West Supp. 1983)
(6) DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §§ 1335-1336 (1979 & Supp. 1983)
(7) D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 23-541 to -556 (1981)
(8) FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 934.01-.10 (West 1973 & Supp. 1983)
(9) HAwAIi REV. STAT. §§ 803-41 to -50 (Supp. 1983)
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Therefore, government authorities will be able to conduct elec-
tronic surveillance of subscriber communications over the in-
teractive cable television system without the restrictions on
electronic surveillance embodied in Title III.
B. Government Access to Recorded Information
Government authorities need not resort to electronic surveil-
lance of subscriber communications in order to gain access to
the information transmitted within the interactive cable televi-
sion system. The government may obtain the information di-
(10) IDAHO CODE §§ 18-6701 to -6710 (Supp. 1984)
(11) ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 108A-1 to -11 (1980 & Supp. 1984)
(12) KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 22-2514 to -2519 (1981)
(13) Ky. REV. STAT. §§ 526.010-.080 (1975 & Supp. 1982)
(14) LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 15:1301-:1312 (West 1981)
(15) ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 709-713 (1980 & Supp. 1983)
(16) MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. §§ 10-401 to -413 (1984)
(17) MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 272, § 99 (West 1970)
(18) MICH. STAT. ANN. §§ 28.807-.807(a) (Callaghan 1982)
(19) MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 626A.01-.23 (West 1983)
(20) MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-8-283 (1983)
(21) NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 86-701 to -712 (1981 & Supp. 1981)
(22) NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 179.410-.515 (1983)
(23) N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 570-A:1-:11 (1974 & Supp. 1983)
(24) N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:156A-1 to -26 (West 1971 & Supp. 1984)
(25) N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 30-12-1 to -14 (1984)
(26) N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAw §§ 700.05-.70 (McKinney 1971 & Supp. 1983)
(27) N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-155 (1981)
(28) N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 12.1-15-02 to -05 (1976)
(29) OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2933.58 (Page 1981)
(30) OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 176.1 (West 1983)
(31) OR. REV. STAT. §§ 133.721-.727 (1983)
(32) 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 5701-5726 (Purdon 1983 & Supp. 1984)
(33) R.I. GEN. LAws §§ 12-5.1-1 to -16 (1981)
(34) S.D. COMP. LAws ANN. §§ 23A-35A-1 to -21 (1983)
(35) TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-3-1324 (1982)
(36) TEX. CRIM. PRoc. CODE ANN. art 18.20 (Vernon Supp. 1984)
(37) UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 77-23a-1 to -11 (1982)
(38) VA. CODE §§ 19.2-61 to -70 (1983)
(39) WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 9.73.030-.140 (1977 & Supp. 1984)
(40) WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 968.27-.33 (West 1971 & Supp. 1983)
(41) Wyo. STAT. § 37-12-122 (1977)
These statutes fail to regulate the surveillance of the contents of digital communica-
tions by a device which records that information without the aid of sound. Thus, these
laws will not affect the restriction of electronic surveillance of communications within
the interactive cable television system. Moreover, because Title III and state statutes
modeled after Title III do not regulate surveillance of digital communications, these
statutes have no effect on surveillance conducted either by government authorities or
by private entities. See supra note 26.
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rectly from the recorded files of a cable company.10 3 Existing
law provides inadequate safeguards against government ac-
cess to records of third parties. 10 4 Thus, subscribers may have
minimal control over the distribution of information recorded
within the interactive cable television system.
1. Recorded Information and the Fourth Amendment
Fourth amendment restrictions upon the power of govern-
ment authorities to gain access to information recorded in the
interactive cable television system are less severe than those
upon electronic surveillance of subscriber communications.
As with electronic surveillance, the government may gain ac-
cess to recorded information with the permission of the cable
broadcaster without a search warrant.105 However, unlike elec-
tronic surveillance, government authorities may also gain war-
rantless access to such information without the consent of
either the cable broadcaster or the subscriber.0 6
Subscribers may not be entitled to fourth amendment pro-
tection if a cable broadcaster discloses individually identifiable
information to the government without their consent. In
United States v. Miller,10 7 the Supreme Court held that a bank
depositor has no fourth amendment interests in bank
records10 8 given'0 9 by a bank to the government, 10 since a de-
positor has no legitimate expectation of privacy in the contents
of his or her bank record."' The Court reasoned that the infor-
103. See infra notes 105-44 and accompanying text.
104. Id.
105. See supra notes 60-77 and accompanying text.
106. See supra notes 54-59 and accompanying text.
107. 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
108. A bank must maintain records of each check, draft, or similar instrument re-
ceived for deposit or collection, together with an identification of the party for whose
account such an instrument is to be deposited or collected. A bank must also maintain
reproductions of such instruments. 12 U.S.C. § 1829b(d) (1982). The maintenance of
these records has been held not to violate the fourth amendment rights of depositors.
California Bankers Ass'n v. Schultz, 416 U.S. 21, 59-70 (1974).
109. The bank produced evidence of Miller's bank records in response to a sub-
poena duces tecum served by the government. Miller moved that the evidence should
be suppressed because of a defect in the subpoena. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. at
437-41. The Court noted that the existence of Miller's fourth amendment interests in
the bank records did not turn on whether or not the subpoena was defective. Id. at 441
n.2.
110. Id at 443.
111. Id. at 442-43. In response to the Miller decision, Congress passed the Right to
Financial Privacy Act of 1978. This statute places greater restrictions on access to bank
records by federal government agencies. 12 U.S.C. §§ 3401-3422 (Supp. 1983). See Note,
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mation within the records is voluntarily conveyed by the de-
positor and is exposed to bank employees in the ordinary
course of business. 112 Once the depositor reveals the informa-
tion to the bank, he or she takes the risk that the record will be
turned over by the bank to government authorities." 3 Thus, a
depositor cannot successfully challenge a subpoena of the
bank's records on fourth amendment grounds." 4
A subscriber would have no greater fourth amendment inter-
est in information transmitted to a cable broadcaster than a
bank depositor would have in bank records. Subscribers will
voluntarily convey information to a cable broadcaster whose
employees may have access to the information in the ordinary
course of business."5 Under Miller, a subscriber would have
no legitimate expectation of privacy under the fourth amend-
ment that a cable broadcaster would not convey recorded in-
formation to the government." 6
Even if a cable broadcaster refuses to convey information re-
garding the subscriber to the government authorities, the gov-
ernment may obtain the information without a search warrant.
The Supreme Court has held that a subpoena directed to a
third party does not violate the fourth amendment interests of
either the third party or the person under investigation."7
Therefore, government authorities may subpoena the informa-
tion over the objections of both. 18
Moreover, a subpoena may be issued subject to less restric-
tive standards than a search warrant." 9 The fourth amend-
ment requires that a search warrant be issued only pursuant to
prior judicial approval upon a showing of probable cause. 21
However, a subpoena may be issued by any government
The Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978, 28 DE PAUL L. REV. 1059 (1979); H.R. REP.
No. 1383, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 33, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 9305.
See also infra notes 124-29 and accompanying text.
112. 425 U.S. at 442.
113. Id. at 443.
114. Id. at 444-45.
115. See supra notes 76-77.
116. See supra notes 60-64 and accompanying text.
117. Donaldson v. United States, 400 U.S. 517, 522 (1971). See California Bankers
Ass'n v. Schultz, 416 U.S. 21, 53 (1974).
118. 400 U.S. at 522; 416 U.S. at 53.
119. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. at 445-46; Oklahoma Press Pub. Co. v. Walling,
327 U.S. 186, 208 (1946).
120. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. at 357.
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agency,121 as authorized by law,122 so long as the investigation
will be conducted for a legitimate purpose, the materials speci-
fied are relevant to the inquiry, and the subpoena's terms are
not too broad.123 Because the government may subpoena the
records of a cable broadcaster, subscribers will not be entitled
to the protection of the higher standards required for the issu-
ance of a search warrant, even if both the cable broadcaster
and the subscriber object to the release of the records.
2. Recorded Information and Statutory Law
Existing statutes provide conceptual methods for restricting
disclosure of recorded information. These methods could pro-
vide subscribers with the privacy protection that the fourth
amendment fails to provide. However, these statutes do not
clearly restrict disclosure of recorded information to the
government.
(a) Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978
The Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978124 restricts the
manner by which federal government agencies may gain ac-
cess to recorded information held by financial institutions 125
regarding their customers. 26 First, government agencies may
not obtain these records unless: (1) the customer has author-
ized disclosure; (2) the records are the subject of an adminis-
trative or judicial subpoena of which the customer is given
notice; (3) the records are the subject of a search warrant; or
121. Administrative agencies have no power to enforce their own subpoenas. En-
forcement must be obtained by judicial order. United States v. Powell, 379 U.S. 48, 57-
58 (1964).
122. Statutes applicable to each government agency limit that agency's subpoena
power. Id. at 56-57. Federal government agencies are generally authorized to issue
subpoenas requiring the production of documents. 5 U.S.C. § 555 (1977). Certain agen-
cies are given specific statutory authority to issue subpoenas. See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. § 7602
(Supp. 1983) (Internal Revenue Service).
123. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. at 445-46; Oklahoma Press Pub. Co. v. Walling,
327 U.S. at 208. Statutes may apply stricter standards to the issuance of a subpoena.
See United States v. Powell, 379 U.S. at 57-58. However, under the fourth amendment,
subpoenas, unlike search warrants, may be issued despite a lack of showing of prob-
able cause. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. at 446.
124. 12 U.S.C. §§ 3401-3422 (Supp. 1982). See supra note 111.
125. "Financial institutions" within the statutory definition include banks, savings
banks, card issuers, industrial loan companies, savings and loans, building and loans,
homestead associations, credit unions, and consumer finance institutions. 12 U.S.C.
§ 3401(1) (Supp. 1982).
126. See Note, supra note 111, at 1062.
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(4) the records are the subject of a formal written request by
the government, of which the customer is given notice.
127
Thus, financial institutions may not voluntarily convey infor-
mation regarding their customers except upon some manner of
formal request by a government agency. Moreover, the statute
gives the customer standing to challenge the government's
right to gain access to these records.'28 Finally, the customer is
granted a statutory right of privacy in the records within the
possession of the financial institution.'29
Although the statute restricts governmental access to infor-
mation recorded by financial institutions, cable broadcasters
are not members of the class of financial institutions that are
regulated by the statute. 30 Financial institutions may offer in-
teractive cable television services, which will permit cable
companies to record that same information transmitted by
subscribers.13' However, the records of cable broadcasters will
not be subject to the statutory protections provided to the
records of financial institutions. Thus, a subscriber's informa-
tional privacy is provided statutory protection when it is in the
hands of a financial institution, but such protection is lost if
that identical information come into the possession of a cable
company.
(b) Title III
Title II132 restricts disclosure of recorded information to the
government by prohibiting the interception,133 and thus, the re-
cording, of the contents of wire communications. 34  Clearly,
127. 12 U.S.C. § 3402 (Supp. 1982). A formal request may only be made if no sub-
poena appears reasonably available and there is reason to believe that the records
sought are relevant to a legitimate law enforcement inquiry. The request must be au-
thorized under the regulations promulgated by the issuing agency. Notice of the re-
quest and the right to challenge must be served upon the customer. 12 U.S.C. § 3408
(Supp. 1982).
128. 12 U.S.C. § 3410 (Supp. 1982).
129. The statute expressly recognizes the customer's expectation of confidentiality
in the records. 12 U.S.C. § 3403 (Supp. 1982). See supra note 111.
130. See supra note 125.
131. See supra notes 11-12.
132. See supra note 78.
133. Title III extends the prohibition against unauthorized interception to the gov-
ernment and to private parties. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510(6), 2511 (1982). See supra note 84 and
accompanying text.
134. Under Title III, any person may intercept a live communication if he or she is a
party to the communication or has been given the prior consent of such a party. 18
U.S.C. § 2511(2) (c)-(d) (1982). Thus, the discussion of the White decision, see supra
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however, Title III does not apply to interactive cable television
system communications.13 Thus, Title III will pose no barrier
to the disclosure of information recorded by cable
broadcasters.
(c) The Fair Credit Reporting Act
The Fair Credit Reporting Act 136 permits consumers to chal-
lenge the accuracy 3v of personal, credit related information1 38
held by a consumer reporting agency.139 If the consumer can
demonstrate the inaccuracy of the recorded information, that
information must be corrected. 40 Thus, the statute regulates
notes 60-64 and accompanying text, also applies to demonstrate a further deficiency in
Title III regarding the privacy of subscriber communications. See supra notes 83-94
and accompanying text.
135. See supra notes 82-102 and accompanying text.
136. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1681t (1982). The Act has been held to be a constitutional reg-
ulation of commercial free speech under the first amendment. Millstone v. O'Hanlon
Reports, Inc., 528 F.2d 829, 833 (8th Cir. 1976). See supra note 26.
137. 15 U.S.C. § 1681i (1982). Consumers may also challenge allegedly obsolete in-
formation. 15 U.S.C. § 1681c (1982). Paid tax liens, arrest records, suits and judgments,
and other adverse items of information which antedate by seven years a report made
to a third party may not be contained within the report. 15 U.S.C. § 1681c (1982).
138. The statute labels such information as a "consumer report." 15 U.S.C.
§ 1681a(d) (1982). A consumer report is a communication of any information bearing
on a consumer's credit rating or character. 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(d) (1982).
139. 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(f) (1982). A consumer reporting agency has four characteris-
tics: (1) it acts for monetary fees, dues, or on a cooperative non-profit basis; (2) it regu-
larly engages in whole or in part in gathering or evaluating information on consumers;
(3) it distributes the information to third parties engaged in commerce; and (4) it uses
a facility of interstate commerce to prepare or distribute the reports. 15 U.S.C.
§ 1681a(f) (1982); Porter v. Talbot Perkins Children's Servs., 355 F. Supp. 174, 176-77
(S.D.N.Y. 1973); Greenway v. Information Dynamics, Ltd., 398 F. Supp. 1092, 1097 (D.
Ariz. 1974).
140. Consumers are permitted to dispute the accuracy or completeness of the infor-
mation contained within the agency's file. 15 U.S.C. § 1681i (1982). Upon the con-
sumer's request, a consumer reporting agency must clearly and accurately disclose to
a consumer the nature and substance of all information on file regarding that con-
sumer. 15 U.S.C. § 1681g (1982). The consumer reporting agency must disclose the
information to the consumer within five (5) days of receipt of the request. 15 U.S.C.
§ 1681d(b) (1982). The consumer reporting agency must investigate the dispute within
a reasonable time and record the current status of the disputed information. If the
investigation proves that the information previously recorded was inaccurate, this in-
formation must be deleted. 15 U.S.C. § 1681i(a) (1982). If the investigation does not
resolve the dispute, the consumer may file a brief statement with the consumer report-
ing agency setting forth the nature of the dispute. 15 U.S.C. § 1681i(b) (1982).
Unless the agency has reasonable grounds to believe that the dispute is irrevelant, it
must clearly note in future disclosures that the information is disputed. The con-
sumer's statement setting forth the dispute should be provided to third parties ob-
taining reports regarding the consumer. 15 U.S.C. § 1681i(c) (1982). If the information
is found to be inaccurate, then the agency must furnish clear notice of the inaccuracy
COMM/ENT L. J.
the content of information files that can be disclosed to third
parties.
However, the provisions of the Fair Credit Reporting Act do
not apply to recorded information concerning subscribers. The
statute has been held not to apply to information obtained
through a transaction between the consumer and the party
that holds the information.'41 Much of the information re-
corded by cable broadcasters will be transmitted during the
transaction of business with subscribers.'42 Cable companies
will be exempt from the requirements of the statute.143 Thus,
subscribers may have little protection against the further dis-




Current laws do not protect the privacy of subscribers re-
garding personal information transmitted within the interac-
tive cable television system.145 Specific statutes should be
drafted in order to counteract the abuses which may arise with
the development of interactive cable systems. These abuses
include: (1) centralization of large amounts of individually
identifiable information which can be recorded by cable broad-
casters; (2) disclosure of information recorded within the inter-
active cable television system; (3) interception of
communications transmitted by subscribers to or through
cable broadcasters; and (4) proliferation of inaccurate informa-
tion stored by and disclosed from the interactive cable televi-
sion system. Furthermore, these statutes should provide for
civil remedies and criminal penalties in order to curb these po-
tential abuses. This article proposes a Model Act which pro-
vides safeguards designed to protect the informational privacy
to parties to whom the information was previously disclosed. 15 U.S.C. § 1681i(d)
(1982).
141. 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(d) (1982). The statute does not apply to the records of a de-
partment store when a consumer makes a purchase from that department store. See
Todd v. Associated Credit Bureau Servs., Inc., 451 F. Supp. 447, 449 (E.D. Pa. 1977),
af'd, 578 F.2d 1376 (3d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1068 (1979).
142. See supra notes 11-17 and accompanying text.
143. See supra note 141.
144. See supra notes 137 and 140.
145. See supra notes 41-144 and accompanying text.
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of subscribers to interactive cable television systems.146
First, the Model Act restricts the ability of cable companies
to centralize information within the interactive cable television
system.147 The Model Act prohibits a cable company from re-
cording individually identifiable information regarding the
subscriber without the subscriber's written authorization. 48 A
cable television company will be permitted to record and use
the information without the subscriber's authorization for lim-
ited business purposes. 49 However, once the business use of
the information is completed, the cable company must destroy
the information. 50
Second, the Model Act restricts the right of cable companies
to disclose information about the subscriber to government au-
thorities.' 51 The Model Act expressly grants to the subscriber
a statutory expectation of privacy in all information which may
be recorded within the interactive cable television system. 15 2
A cable company may not disclose any information regarding
the subscriber to a government authority without the sub-
146. See Model Cable Television Privacy Act, Appendix [hereinafter cited as Model
Act]. The Model Act is based largely on a statute proposed in the state of New York
that was rejected by the state legislature in 1982. See The Future of Cable Television in
New York State, supra note 19.
Only the state of California has enacted laws which expressly deal with the relation
between interactive cable television and the privacy of subscriber communications.
CAL. PENAL CODE § 637.5 (West 1982). This article will compare the California statute
to the proposed Model Act. See infra notes 147-75 and accompanying text.
The issue of informational privacy has created concern in other countries as well.
Data protection legislation has been enacted recently in France, Austria, Luxembourg,
and West Germany. See Coombe & Kirk, Privacy, Data Protection, and Transborder
Flow, 39 Bus. LAw. 33 (1983).
147. See Model Act, supra note 146, § C.
148. Id. The California statute contains a similar section. CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 637.5(b) (West Supp. 1983).
149. Both the Model Act and the California statute provide that a cable company
may record and use the information within the interactive system without the authori-
zation of the subscriber in order to verify that there is no unauthorized reception of an
interactive service or to facilitate the billing of subscribers. See Model Act, supra note
146, § B(4); CAL. PENAL CODE § 637.5(b) (West Supp. 1983).
150. Model Act, supra note 146, § C (4). The California statute provides no such re-
quirement for cable companies.
151. See id. § D.
152. Id. The Model Act requires a cable company to notify its subscribers of their
rights upon application for an interactive service. See id. § H. Any waiver of rights
conferred by the Model Act is prohibited and declared to be null and void. See id. § L.
The California statute also requires a cable company to make such a notification to
subscribers. CAL. PENAL CODE § 637.5(c) (West Supp. 1983). However, there is no pro-
vision prohibiting the waiver of rights by subscribers.
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scriber's authorization,5 3 unless the government authority
serves the cable company with a properly issued search
warrant.
154
Third, the Model Act expressly prohibits any person or gov-
ernment authority from intercepting any communication
transmitted from a subscriber terminal. 55 Thus, the Model Act
corrects the deficiency in existing laws, which only prohibit
electronic surveillance of "aurally acquired" commun-
ications. 156
Fourth, the Model Act restricts the proliferation of inaccu-
rate information collected and disclosed by a cable television
company. 157 Subscribers may dispute the status of the infor-
mation if they contend 158 that the information is inaccurate, in-
complete, or no longer verifiable.' The cable company must
investigate the validity of the subscriber's challenge. 60 If the
investigation proves that the stored information is inaccurate,
incomplete, or no longer verifiable, the cable company must
153. The authorization may be revoked at any time by the subscriber upon 10 days
notice to the cable company. Model Act, supra note 146, § D(1) (a).
154. The search warrant must be issued pursuant to the requirements of the statute
that grants a court authority to issue the search warrant. Thus, a federally issued
search warrant must comply with the requirements of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure. A search warrant issued by a state court must comply with the require-
ments of the state's applicable statute for the issuance of a search warrant. Id. § D(6).
The California statute permits disclosure to a government authority pursuant to the
issuance of either a search warrant or a subpoena. See supra notes 117-23 and accom-
panying text.
155. See Model Act, supra note 146, § I. California law also prohibits the intercep-
tion of any form of electronic communication. CAL. PENAL CODE § 631 (West Supp.
1983). See supra note 79. In addition, both California law and the Model Act expressly
prohibit the unauthorized monitoring of the viewing patterns, practices, conversations,
or events within the residence, workplace, or place of business of subscribers. Model
Act, supra note 146, § B(1); CAL PENAL CODE § 637.5(a) (1) (West Supp. 1983).
156. See supra notes 78-102 and accompanying text.
157. See Model Act, supra note 146, §§ E-G.
158. Subscribers may request a copy of all individually identifiable information
maintained by the cable company. Id. § E (1). The cable company must respond to the
subscriber's request within 10 days by providing the subscriber with a translation in
common language and in a clear manner. Id. § E (1). The subscriber must challenge
the validity of the disputed information within 60 days of receipt of the requested in-
formation. Id. § F(1).
159. The California law permits subscribers to gain access to information regarding
the subscriber and held by the cable company. CAL. PENAL CODE § 637.5(d) (West
Supp. 1983). If a subscriber makes a reasonable showing that the information is inac-
curate, the cable company must correct that information. However, the California stat-
ute does not establish definite time periods within which the information must be
corrected. Moreover, the California statute does not provide a clear and precise proce-
dure by which to correct the accuracy of the disputed information.
160. The investigation must be completed within 30 days of the receipt of the sub-
scriber's challenge. Model Act, supra note 146, § F(l).
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correct the information. 16 1 Furthermore, the Model Act re-
quires that cable companies must report the correct status of
the information to any government authority that obtained any
invalid information regarding the subscriber.162
Fifth, the Model Act provides civil remedies for violations of
its provisions.163 An aggrieved subscriber may bring a civil ac-
tion against any government authority or person who engages
in, or procures another to engage in, conduct that violates the
Model Act.' M The subscriber may be awarded actual, general,
or punitive damages from the defendant as the case may
merit.16  Furthermore, the subscriber may bring an action to
enjoin the continued violation of any provision of the Model
Act. 166
Finally, the Model Act provides for criminal penalties against
any person 67 who engages in conduct in violation of the Model
Act. 68 The Model Act punishes any unauthorized person who
discloses recorded information regarding subscribers 69 or in-
tercepts communications transmitted by subscribers. 7 ° More-
over, any person who procures another person to engage in
such criminal conduct may be convicted under the Model
Act.' 71 Persons convicted 72 under these provisions may be
161. The cable company must notify the subscriber of the results of the investiga-
tion and if necessary, correct the inaccurate information within 10 days. Id. § F(1).
162. Id § G(2). The government must, within 10 days of notification, correct the
invalid information within its own records. Id. § G(3).
163. See id. § J.
164. Id. § J(1). The California statute permits aggrieved subscribers to bring an
action for damages against any government authority or person who engages in con-
duct which violates the provisions of the statutes. CAL. PENAL CODE § 637.5(i) (West
Supp. 1983).
165. Model Act, supra note 146, § J(2) (actual and general damages); id. § J(3) (pu-
nitive damages). Furthermore, in any successful action brought by an aggrieved sub-
scriber, the court must award costs and attorney's fees in addition to an award of
damages. Id. § J(4).
166. Id. § J(5). The California statute does not provide for injunctive relief against
continued violations of the statute.
167. The Model Act defines "person" as "[a]ny individual, trustee, partnership, as-
sociation, corporation or other legal entity, or any officer, employee or agent acting or
purporting to act for or on behalf of any government authority." (Emphasis added.)
Id. § A(10).
168. See id. § K. The California law also provides criminal penalties for violation of
the statute. CAL. PENAL CODE § 637.5(j) (West Supp. 1983).
169. Model Act, supra note 146, § K(1).
170. Id. § K(2).
171. Id. § K(3).
172. Persons convicted under the Model Act are guilty of a misdemeanor. Id..
§ K(1).
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Recent technological developments in the field of interactive
cable television communication will soon permit consumers to
subscribe to services which will promote greater efficiency in
daily life. However, these advances will create a corresponding
danger to the informational privacy of subscribers. Govern-
ment authorities may be able to conduct electronic surveil-
lance of the communications transmitted by the subscriber or
obtain the information regarding subscribers recorded within
the computers of a cable television company without judicial
supervision. Existing constitutional and statutory law pro-
vides minimal protection against these abuses of the privacy
rights of subscribers.
The Model Act proposed in this article identifies and regu-
lates the abuses inherent in the interactive cable television
system. It establishes standards to protect subscribers whose
informational privacy rights may be threatened by the advent
of interactive cable television technology. Thus, subscribers
will be able to enjoy the benefits of interactive cable television
without falling prey to the potential abuses inherent in the ad-
vent of this technology.
173. The fine may not exceed $3,000. Id. § L(l)-(3). The California statute contains
the same limitation. CAL. PENAL CODE § 637.5(j) (West Supp. 1983).174. The sentence may not exceed one year. Model Act, supra note 146, § L(1)-(3).
The California statute contains the same limitation. CAL. PENAL CODE § 637.5(j) (West
Supp. 1983).
175. Model Act, supra note 146, § L(l)-(3). The California statute contains the same




MODEL CABLE TELEVISION PRIVACY ACT
A. Definitions
For the purpose of the Model Cable Television Privacy Act,
the following words and terms shall have these meanings
ascribed to them.
(1) "Cable television company." Any person owning, control-
ling, operating, managing or leasing one or more cable televi-
sion systems within the state, and its officers, employees, or
agents, including any governmental authority which owns and
operates a cable television system, and any person providing
cable television service over any channel or channels leased
from a cable television company.
(2) "Cable television service." A service offered over one or
more cable television systems.
(3) "Cable television system." Any system which operates
for hire the service of receiving and amplifying programs
broadcast by one or more television and radio stations and any
other programs originated by a cable television company or by
another party, and distributing such programs by wire, cable,
microwave or other means, whether such means are owned or
leased, to persons in one or more municipalities who subscribe
to such service. Such definition shall also include any system
that not only distributes programs by wire, cable, microwave or
other means to subscribers but also collects or receives or re-
distributes signals transmitted by wire, cable, microwave or
other means from subscriber terminals. Such definition does
not include any system which serves fewer than fifty (50)
subscribers.
(4) "Upstream communications channel." A signaling path
provided by a cable television system for transmission of sig-
nals of any type from a subscriber terminal to another point in
the cable system.
(5) "Government authority." Any office, department, board,
commission, bureau, division, public corporation, agency or in-
strumentality of the United States, or of any state, common-
wealth, territory, possession or political subdivision thereof.
(6) "Individually identifiable information." Any information
that identifies any individual as a subscriber to, or user of,
cable television service, or that otherwise provides information
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about that individual, or his or her use of any service provided
by a cable television system.
(7) "Interactive cable television service." A cable television
service offered over one or more interactive cable television
systems involving the collection, reception, aggregation, stor-
age or use of information contained in signals transmitted from
subscriber terminals over upstream communications channels.
(8) "Interactive cable television system." A cable television
system having the capability for transmission of signals of any
type from a subscriber terminal over an upstream communica-
tions channel to any other point in the cable communications
system including, but not limited to a cable television process-
ing center.
(9) "Intercept." To acquire at any time from initiation to
completion of a signal transmission over a cable television sys-
tem, or any associated communications or processing system,
the content of the information contained in that signal.
(10) "Person." Any individual, trustee, partnership, associa-
tion, corporation or other legal entity, or any officer, employee
or agent acting or purporting to act for or on behalf of any gov-
ernment authority.
(11) "Program." Any broadcast-type program signal,
message, graphics, data or communication content service.
(12) "Subscriber." Any person who receives any form of
cable television service.
(13) "Subscriber terminal." Any terminal within the home,
business, or other location of a subscriber connected to the
cable television system and enabling a subscriber to perform
various functions relating to cable television service including
selecting a program or channel or responding to cable televi-
sion company requests for information.
B. Subscriber Authorization for Transmission of Signals from
Subscriber Terminals
(1) Except as provided in subdivision four of this section, no
signal of an upstream communications channel may be trans-
mitted from a subscriber terminal for purposes of monitoring
individual residential, workplace, or place of business viewing
patterns, practices, conversations, or events, except with the
written authorization of the subscriber contained in a docu-
ment separate from any contract signed by the subscriber with
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the cable television company for noninteractive cable televi-
sion service.
(2) No penalty of any kind shall be invoked by a cable televi-
sion company for the failure of a subscriber to provide, or the
revocation by the subscriber of, the written authorization re-
quired under subdivision one of this section.
(3) A subscriber's written authorization pursuant to subdivi-
sion one of this section shall not be required by a cable televi-
sion company as a condition of receiving any non-interactive
cable television service.
(4) Written authorization pursuant to subdivision one of this
section shall not be required for a cable television company to
conduct system-wide or individually addressed electronic
sweeps for the purpose of verifying that there is no unauthor-
ized reception of cable television service or of monitoring for
the purpose of billing.
C. Permissible Collection, Aggregation and Uses of Individually
Identifiable Information
(1) A cable television company may collect, receive, store, ag-
gregate, and use such individually identifiable information re-
lating to any subscriber, subscriber household, or user of a
subscriber terminal as is necessary to verify that there is no
unauthorized reception of cable television service or to bill
subscribers for the purchase of any cable television service.
(2) Except as provided in subdivision one of this section, a
cable television company may not collect, receive, store, aggre-
gate or use individually identifiable information relating to any
subscriber, subscriber household, or user of a subscriber ter-
minal without written authorization from the subscriber to col-
lect, receive, store, aggregate or use such information following
notification to the subscriber of the information practices of
the cable television company pursuant to subdivision one of
section H of this chapter.
(3) Except as provided in subdivision one of this section, a
cable television company may collect, receive, store, aggregate,
and use only such individually identifiable information relating
to any subscriber, subscriber household, or user of a sub-
scriber terminal as is necessary to provide the cable television
services requested by the subscriber and as is described in the
notification of the information practices given by the cable tele-
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vision company to the subscriber pursuant to subdivision one
of section H of this chapter.
(4) Individually identifiable information about a subscriber
shall be destroyed by the cable television company upon com-
pletion of the permissible uses of that information.
D. Expectation of Privacy
(1) A cable television company shall not disclose individually
identifiable information relating to any subscriber, subscriber
household, or user of a subscriber terminal except where dis-
closure is made:
(a) with the written authorization of the subscriber, which
authorization may be revoked at any time upon ten
(10) days notice to the cable television company; or
(b) to the subscriber pursuant to section E of this chapter;
or
(c) to a government authority pursuant to subdivision six
of this section.
(2) A cable television company may disclose individually
identifiable information relating to any subscriber, subscriber
household, or user of a subscriber terminal to a person other
than the cable television company, who requires the informa-
tion to perform a legitimate business or legal service on behalf
of the cable television company if all the following conditions
are met:
(a) the business or legal service is necessary to provide
cable television service requested by the subscriber;
and
(b) the information disclosed is limited to information
that is necessary to perform the legitmate business or
legal service; and
(c) the disclosure is in accordance with previous notifica-
tion given the subscriber pursuant to section H of this
chapter indicating the disclosures necessary to pro-
vide the cable television service requested by the sub-
scriber; and
(d) the subscriber has given written authorization for
such disclosures to occur in the course of providing
the cable television service; and
(e) the cable television company enters into a written
agreement with the person which prohibits redis-
closure of the information, except in accordance with
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the notification to the subscriber required by section
H of this chapter and with the approval of the cable
television company, and which also requires the per-
son to destroy the information upon completion of the
permissible uses of that information.
(3) Information disclosed under this section may not subse-
quently be used by the person receiving it, other than the sub-
scriber to whom it relates, except in accordance with the
notification given pursuant to subdivision one of section H of
this chapter or the uses allowed by a subscriber's written au-
thorization pursuant to subdivision one of this section.
(4) Officers, employees and agents of the cable television
company shall have access to individually identifiable informa-
tion relating to any subscriber, subscriber household, or user
of a subscriber terminal only to the extent necessary for the
sole purpose of providing the cable television service re-
quested by the subscriber.
(5) No person shall obtain from a cable television company
individually identifiable information relating to any subscriber,
subscriber household, or user of a subscriber terminal except
as provided in this section.
(6) No government authority shall obtain from a cable televi-
sion company individually identifiable information relating to
any subscriber, except:
(a) with the subscriber's written authorization; or
(b) under legal compulsion of a search warrant.
(7) No government authority which obtains any individually
identifiable information relating to any subscriber under this
section shall disclose such information to any other govern-
ment authority, except with the subscriber's authorization.
(8) Except as proof in an action or prosecution for violation of
this section, no evidence obtained in violation of this section
shall be admissible in any judicial, administrative, legislative
or other proceeding.
E. Subscriber Access to Cable Television Company Information
(1) Upon written request by a subscriber, a cable television
company shall within five (5) days of receiving such request
provide the subscriber with copies of all individually identifi-
able information relating to the subscriber, subscriber house-
hold, or user of a subscriber terminal currently maintained by
the cable television company. If any individually identifiable
No. 41
COMM/ENT L. J.
information exists in machine-readable form only, the cable
television company shall translate this information into non-
technical language, written in a clear and coherent manner, us-
ing words with common and everyday meanings, and provide
the requesting subscriber with a copy of the translation as well
as a copy of the information in machine-readable form.
(2) A cable television company shall make the disclosures re-
quired under subdivision one of this section to the subscriber
in person, by mail, or in any combination of these ways at the
option of the subscriber.
(3) A cable television company may charge a subscriber only
for the cost of making any copies of information provided to
the subscriber pursuant to this section, and no other fees may
be charged.
F. Procedure in Case of Disputed Accuracy
(1) If the accuracy or completeness of any item of informa-
tion disclosed to a subscriber by the cable television company
pursuant to section E of this chapter is disputed by the sub-
scriber, and such dispute is conveyed within sixty (60) days of
the receipt of the disputed information directly to the cable tel-
evision company in writing or in person by the subscriber, the
cable television company shall within thirty (30) days investi-
gate and record the current status of the disputed information.
Such investigation shall be completed within thirty (30) days
of its commencement. If after such investigation the informa-
tion is found to be inaccurate, incomplete, or can no longer be
verified, the cable television company shall within ten (10)
days delete or correct the information. The cable television
company may not require the appearance of a subscriber at its
office as a precondition to the right of a subscriber to an inves-
tigation under this section.
(2) After completion of any investigation pursuant to subdivi-
sion one of this section, the cable television company shall
within ten (10) days notify the subscriber of the result of the
investigation or of its decision regarding deletion or inclusion
of information and shall clearly and conspicuously disclose to
the subscriber his or her rights under subdivisions three and
four of this section.
(3) If the investigation does not resolve the dispute, the sub-
scriber may file a statement with the cable television company
setting forth the nature of the dispute. The cable television
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company may limit such statements to not more than five hun-
dred (500) words if it provides the subscriber with assistance
in writing a clear summary of the dispute.
(4) Whenever a statement of a dispute is filed, the cable tele-
vision company shall, in any subsequent disclosure containing
the information in question, clearly note that it is disputed by
the subscriber and provide the recipient with a copy of the
statement filed by the subscriber. A mere reference to the fact
that a dispute is in the record and may be obtained on request
does not comply with this section.
G. Cable Television Company Correction of Errors
(1) All individually identifiable information reported by a
cable television company to any person or government author-
ity shall be accurate, complete and verifiable.
(2) Whenever a cable television company learns that it has
reported individually identifiable information inaccurately or
incompletely within the past six (6) months to another person
or government authority, it shall within ten (10) days notify
that person or government authority of the error.
(3) Whenever a person or government authority receives
from a cable television company an error notification pursuant
to subdivision two of this section, such person or government
authority shall correct the error within ten (10) days of
notification.
H. Notification of Cable Television Company Information Practices
(1) At the same time an application is made for any cable tel-
evision service or services, a cable television company shall no-
tify the applicant in writing, for each cable television service
for which the application is made, concerning:
(a) the types of information that the cable television com-
pany expects to collect or receive from subscribers,
subscriber households, or users of subscriber termi-
nals in order to provide the cable television service;
and
(b) the types of persons to whom, and the circumstances
under which, information must be disclosed in order
to provide the cable television service, and the types of
information that must be disclosed for that purpose.
(2) At the same time that any application is made for any
cable television service or services, a cable television company
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shall provide the applicant with a notice containing a clear
statement concerning the subscriber's right to privacy protec-
tion as provided by this chapter.
I. Interception of Signals from Subscriber Terminals
(1) No person shall intercept, or procure any person to inter-
cept, a signal of an upstream communications channel trans-
mitted from a subscriber terminal except the subscriber and
the intended receiver of the signal, except that a cable televi-
sion company may intercept such signals only pursuant to Sec-
tion C.
(2) No government authority shall intercept a signal of an up-
stream communications channel transmitted from a subscriber
terminal without the consent of both the subscriber and the
intended receiver of the signal.
(3) Except as proof in an action or prosecution of violating
this section, no evidence obtained in violation of this section
shall be admissible in any judicial, administrative, legislative,
or other proceeding.
J. Civil Remedies
(1) Any person or government authority who discloses or in-
tercepts, or procures any person to disclose or intercept, indi-
vidually identifiable information, or otherwise engages in
conduct in violation of this chapter, shall be liable to the ag-
grieved subscriber acting either in an individual capacity or as
a member of a class for all actual damages sustained by the
subscriber or the class as a result of the disclosure.
(2) If actual damages are awarded under subdivision one of
this section, any person or government authority who discloses
or intercepts, or procures any person to disclose or intercept,
individually identifiable information, or who otherwise en-
gages in conduct in violation of this chapter, shall also be liable
to the aggrieved subscriber for such general damages as the
court may allow. In determining the amount of general dam-
ages, the court shall consider, among other relevant factors,
the amount of any actual damages awarded, the nature and se-
riousness of any intangible harm suffered by the subscriber,
the frequency and persistence of failures of compliance by the
defendant, the resources of the defendant, the number of per-
sons adversely affected, and the extent to which the failure of
the defendant to comply was intentional.
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(3) Any person or government authority who intentionally vi-
olates any of the provisions of this chapter shall be liable addi-
tionally to each aggrieved subscriber for punitive damages.
(4) In any successful action brought under subdivisions one,
two and three of this section, the costs of the action, together
with reasonable attorneys' fees as determined by the court,
shall be awarded in addition to any damages.
(5) Whenever there shall be a violation of this chapter, an ag-
grieved subscriber may apply to a court having jurisdiction to
issue an injunction to enjoin and restrain the continuance of
such violation. If it shall appear to the satisfaction of the court
that the defendant has violated this section, an injunction may
be issued by the court to enjoin and restrain any further viola-
tion, without requiring proof that any person has been injured
or damaged by such violation.
(6) No action under this section shall be brought later than
two (2) years from the date of the discovery of the violation,
but in no case shall an action be brought later than seven (7)
years from the date of the violation.
K. Criminal Violations and Penalties
(1) Any person who intentionally discloses information from
a cable television company concerning a subscriber to a person
not authorized by this chapter to receive that information,
shall be guilty of a misdemeanor punishable by a fine not
exceeding three thousand (3000) dollars, or by imprisonment
not exceeding one (1) year, or by both such fine and im-
prisonment.
(2) Any person not authorized by this chapter who intention-
ally intercepts a signal of an upstream communications chan-
nel transmitted from a subscriber terminal shall be guilty of a
misdemeanor punishable by a fine not exceeding three thou-
sand (3000) dollars, or by imprisonment not exceeding one
(1) year, or by both such fine and imprisonment.
(3) Any person who intentionally procures another person to
engage in conduct in violation of subdivisions one or two of this
section, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor punishable by a fine
not exceeding three thousand (3000) dollars, or by imprison-
ment not exceeding one (1) year, or by both such fine and
imprisonment.
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L. Waiver of Subscriber's Rights
(1) Any subscriber's waiver of rights conferred by this chap-
ter shall be prohibited and declared to be null and void.
